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2 Empirical Analyses







From 1988 to 1992, the number of adults applying for and receiving 
benefits from the Social Security Administration's two disability pro 
grams greatly exceeded expectations. There were 330,000 more Social 
Security Disability Insurance (DI) applications in 1992 than in 1988, 
an average annual growth rate of 8.9 percent. Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) applications increased by 430,000 over the same period, 
an annual growth rate of 10.5 percent. Awards grew even faster: an 
average of 10 percent per year for DI and 12 percent for SSI. One 
important feature of application and award growth during this period is 
that it was much higher in two major impairment categories mental 
and musculoskeletal impairments than in others.
In this chapter, we summarize findings from two related studies that 
analyze the determinants of the substantial growth experienced during 
the 1988 to 1992 period. We also summarize findings from a third 
study that examines program growth over the longer period from 1980 
to 1993. 1
We analyze the issue of growth in the disability programs from an 
economic perspective. As discussed in Chapter 1, this perspective 
emphasizes the importance of individual choices in determining indi 
vidual behaviors, such as applying for disability benefits. An individ 
ual's decision to apply for benefits will be influenced by a variety of 
factors, including the costs and benefits of working versus leaving the 
labor force to apply for disability benefits, the availability of potential 
sources of nonlabor income, the availability of health insurance and
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noncash benefits, and the costs associated with the application process. 
The analysis presented here, while not directly modeling the individ 
ual's decision to apply for benefits, examines factors hypothesized to 
affect that decision process and therefore affect application and award 
growth experienced by the federal disability programs.
The major economic factors hypothesized to have an impact on 
growth in disability applications and awards that we examine in this 
analysis include
  Business Cycles: During times of economic downturn, persons 
with disabling health conditions may lose, or find it especially 
difficult to find, employment. Income from other sources may 
also decline. Disability benefits may become more attractive as 
an alternative source of income.
  Economic Restructuring: Changes in the types of jobs available 
in the economy, such as a reduction in the number of manufactur 
ing jobs and an increase in service occupations, may affect dis 
ability applications if those who lose their jobs are unable to 
adapt to the market changes and to impairments that may qualify 
them for disability benefits.
  State and Local Program Interactions: State and local cash and 
noncash support programs offer an alternative source of income 
for some individuals who might otherwise qualify for disability 
benefits. As these programs face budget reductions or political 
pressure to reduce their caseloads, program administrators and 
beneficiaries may seek other sources of support more actively, 
including federal disability benefits.
  "Supply" Changes: In addition to demand factors, the "supply" 
of disability benefits will also impact program growth. The sup 
ply of benefits will be affected by changes in the eligibility crite 
ria, changes in the implementation of the criteria, outreach efforts 
by SSA, and changes in the political and adjudicative environ 
ment surrounding the disability programs.
In addition to the economic factors described above, we also exam 
ine health and demographic factors that may affect disability applica 
tions and awards. Population growth and aging, the increase in female 
labor force participation, and changes in the prevalence of disabling
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health conditions, such as AIDS/HIV, may have substantial impacts on 
disability application and award growth.
The analysis conducted uses a methodology that has not been previ 
ously applied to the analysis of disability program participation: 
"pooled" cross-section time-series analysis of state-level data. Past 
analyses have used either national time-series or cross-section data 
alone. The time-series analyses have been plagued by the difficulty of 
separating the effects of major program changes from the effects of 
other factors. The pooled methodology allows us to control for such 
changes to the extent that they affect all states equally, resulting in 
more definitive estimates for the effects of factors that vary by state. 
Analyses that rely on a single cross section are problematic because the 
effects of unmeasured determinants of program participation that vary 
across states (e.g., the prevalence of chronic health conditions and 
impairments) are confounded with the effects of measured determi 
nants. The pooled methodology allows us to control for unmeasured 
determinants that vary across states, but not over time, in a very simple 
way.
The possibility remains that the estimated effects of state variables 
included in our models are confounded with the effects of supply fac 
tors that vary across states and the effects of unmeasured state vari 
ables that vary across states and over time. Nonetheless, we believe 
that the estimates obtained using the pooled methodology provide a 
much more accurate picture of the importance of the state-level factors 
included in the models than has been obtained previously. Further, 
national growth not accounted for by the state-level variables in the 
model is a more accurate reflection of the impact of program changes 
than national growth alone.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In the next 
section, we describe the application and award data used in the analysis 
and discuss the trends in disability application and award growth that 
occurred over the 1980 to 1994 period. This is followed by a descrip 
tion of the methodology employed to analyze the aggregate application 
and award data and define the independent variables used in the analy 
sis. In the next four sections, we discuss the individual factors hypothe 
sized to affect disability application and award growth. In each of these 
sections, we provide a description of the factor, discuss reasons why it 
is believed to have an impact on disability program growth, and sum-
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marize the findings for the specific factor. Subsequent sections are 
devoted to population changes, to business cycles and economic 
restructuring, to other income support programs, and to supply factors.
APPLICATION AND AWARD GROWTH
In this paper we focus on application and award growth from 1980 
to 1993, with a more detailed analysis of the period from 1988 to 1992. 
For the full period we analyzed the number of initial (medical) deter 
minations and allowances made by state Disability Determination Ser 
vices, and for the 1988-1992 period we examined applications filed 
and final awards. We describe significant features of these data below. 2
The 1980-94 Period
The Initial Determination Data
Initial determinations are the sum of initial allowances and denials 
made by state Disability Determination Services (DDS) for medical 
reasons. We use initial determinations and initial allowances when ana 
lyzing the full period because state-level application and final award 
data are not available in the early part of this period. Initial determina 
tions are lower than applications because denials for nonmedical rea 
sons made before the initial medical determination are not counted. 
Initial allowances are lower than final allowances because the latter 
include allowances made on appeal.
One important feature of the initial determination data used for this 
report is that they are broken down into three program groups: those 
made on claims filed for DI benefits only (Dl-only), those made on 
claims filed for both DI and SSI (concurrent), and those made on 
claims filed for SSI only (SSi-only). There are several reasons for ana 
lyzing these three groups, rather than analyzing total DI and total SSI 
initial determinations independently. First, the analysis of the three 
groups explicitly recognizes the overlap between the two programs. 
Second, concurrent initial determinations have grown at a substantially 
faster rate than either Dl-only or S Si-only initial determinations. Third, 
applicants in the three groups are from three distinct groups with
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respect to attachment to the labor force: Dl-only applicants usually 
have had a strong attachment to the labor force with relatively high 
earnings; concurrent applicants have had a sufficiently strong attach 
ment to the labor force to be covered by the DI program ("disability 
insured"), but relatively low earnings; and SSI-only applicants have 
had at most a limited attachment to the labor force. Finally, a large 
share of those receiving awards for both programs only receive SSI 
benefits until their five-month DI waiting period ends; once they 
receive DI benefits they no longer pass the SSI means test. Rupp and 
Scott (Chapter 4) estimate that 75 percent of concurrent awardees 
receive SSI benefits for less than twelve months.
There are two important limiting features of the initial determina 
tions data. First, they are not disaggregated by sex. As we discuss fur 
ther below, data are available by sex for 1988-1992, and we found very 
large differences in the results for men and women. Second, SSI-only 
initial determinations include initial determinations for children. For 
analysis purposes it would be much better to separate child and adult 
initial determinations, but separate data were not available. We know 
from the national data that child growth dominates the growth in this 
series from 1990 on, and that the causes of this growth are primarily 
the 1990 Supreme Court decision in the case of Sullivan v. Zebley and 
1991 changes in the child listings for mental disorders (GAO 1994).
Initial Determination Growth
It is useful to divide the period from 1980 to 1994 into three distinct 
subperiods (Exhibit 2.1). From 1980 to 1984, initial determinations 
declined sharply, continuing a more gradual decline that began in 1977. 
The decline is usually attributed to aggressive legislative and adminis 
trative efforts to reduce the size of the beneficiary population, which 
presumably discouraged many from applying. One notable feature of 
this period is that the decline occurred in the midst of a slumping econ 
omy. There was a recession in 1980, and before the economy fully 
recovered there was a second recession in 1981-82. If these recessions 
had a positive impact on initial determinations, it was masked by the 
response to tightening of eligibility.
The 1984 amendments to the Social Security Act reversed efforts to 
reduce program caseloads, and in 1985 new impairment listings that 
made it much less difficult to obtain benefits for mental disorders were
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Exhibit 2.1 Initial Determinations for Applicants to SSA's Disability 
Programs, 1980-1994
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
SOURCE SSA, Office of Disability.
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implemented. Initial determinations grew sharply from 1985 to 1986, 
stayed at a high level in 1987, and then declined through 1989.
Since 1989, initial determinations have grown rapidly. While growth 
in initial determinations for children from 1991 was greater than for 
adults, initial determinations for adults also grew .extremely rapidly, 
especially in 1991 and 1992. The recession in 1990-1991 may explain 
some of this growth, but this is not clear from the national data because 
the recession of 1981-82, which was much stronger than the more 
recent recession, had no apparent impact.
Initial Allowance Rates
Initial allowance rates for the full period have an overall upward 
trend for all program groups (Exhibit 2.2). There are three notable 
deviations from the long-term trends: the sharp but temporary drop 
from 1980 to 1982, during the period of administrative tightening; the 
sharp increase from 1985 to 1986, after the new mental disorder list 
ings were implemented, again followed by a decline; and a second 
sharp increase from 1989 to 1992, followed by a decline in 1993 and 
1994.
With one exception, allowance rates for the three program groups 
move parallel to each other throughout the period. The exception is for 
the SSi-only allowance rate, which grew more rapidly than the other 
two allowance rates from 1989 to 1991 during the dramatic increase in 
initial determinations for children caused by Zebley and the new men 
tal impairment listings for children. As a general rule, it would seem 
that the dominant determinants of initial allowance rates are quite sim 
ilar for all three program groups.
The 1988-1992 Period
Disability Research File Data
SSA provided state-level tabulations of applications and awards for 
the 1988-92 period from its new Disability Research File (DRF), a 
micro database on all disability applications filed from 1988 on. The 
tabulations for both programs include application and award tables for 
each year and state, cross-classified by gender, age (five age groups), 
and impairment. All the DRF-based estimates in this report are for 
those age 18-64 only, including SSI-only estimates. The classification









1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
•Dl-only —- — -Concurrent • • - SSI-only •Total
SOURCE: SSA, Office of Disability
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of applications and awards into Dl-only, concurrent, and SSI-only 
groups is more difficult than the classification of initial determinations 
and allowances because applications for the two programs are not 
always filed at the same time or even in the same state. For this study, 
the state-level DI application and award data are classified by whether 
the DI applicant applied for SSI, regardless of where or when ("DI- 
concurrent" versus "Dl-only"). We did not obtain state-level SSI data 
disaggregated in a symmetric way (i.e., "SSi-concurrent" versus "SSI- 
only"). It appears likely, though, that analysis of analogously defined 
SSI-concurrent data would yield results similar to those reported here 
for Dl-concurrent applications and awards. National level SSI-concur 
rent and SSI-only data are available. We report national trends in SSI- 
only applications later in this section, but omit SSI-concurrent trends 
because they are very similar to those in the Dl-concurrent category. 3
The DRF award data include allowances made at all levels, not just 
initial allowances. They are dated by the year the application was filed, 
which is often earlier than the year that the allowance was actually 
made. Thus, "1992 awards" means awards for applications filed in 
1992.4 Many 1992 applications still had award decisions pending as of 
July, 1993, the closing date for the initial state tabulations. We subse 
quently analyzed updated state tabulations by gender and program, but 
not by age, gender, impairment, and program. Hence, we only report 
estimates of award models at the gender/program level, using the 
revised data.
Applications and awards in the DRF data are classified on the basis 
of the primary impairment listed in the administrative record for the 
highest level at which the application was considered. For the state- 
level analysis we used only four impairment groups in order to insure 
adequate numbers of cases in individual state/program/age/sex cells, 
but we report national trends in six categories: mental illness, mental 
retardation, musculoskeletal, circulatory, respiratory, and a combined 
category of all other impairments that includes neoplasms, nervous and 
sensory impairments, diseases of the endocrine system, genito-urinary 
conditions, diseases of the skin, blood, and digestive tract, infectious 
diseases, and a small number of unclassified cases. The categories used 
for the state-level analysis are: mental disorders (mental illness and 
mental retardation); musculoskeletal; infectious diseases and unclassi 
fied cases; and a residual category that we call "internal organ" disor-
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ders, in which circulatory impairments, respiratory impairments, and 
neoplasms are the dominant disorders.
Application Growth
Application growth for the 1988 to 1992 period was very rapid 
(Exhibit 2.3), essentially following the pattern of initial determination 
growth examined previously; changes in application growth rates occur 
somewhat earlier than changes in initial determination growth rates 
because of the processing time between the filing of an application and 
the initial determination.
While the distribution of applications by impairment changed only 
moderately from 1988 to 1992, these changes reflect much larger vari 
ation in rates of application growth across categories (Exhibit 2.3). 
Within each program category, the fastest growing application catego 
ries are mental illness, mental retardation, and musculoskeletal, while 
the slowest growing categories are circulatory and respiratory illnesses.
There is also substantial variation in growth rates across subcatego- 
ries of mental and musculoskeletal impairments (Exhibit 2.4). For 
mental disorders, growth in the addiction and affective disorder subcat- 
egories was much more rapid than in other subcategories for all pro 
gram groups; SSI-only applications in the addiction disorder category 
increased by 200 percent over the period. Growth in the anxiety disor 
ders subcategory was also high. Growth in the schizophrenia subcate- 
gory was remarkably low almost no change at all for the three 
categories combined. In the musculoskeletal category, growth in the 
back disorders subcategory, which accounts for over half of all applica 
tions in the category, was much higher than in all other subcategories.
Allowance Rates
As with initial allowance rates, final allowance rates increased sub 
stantially over this period (Exhibit 2.5). The increase is observed in all 
impairment group categories and for all program groups; patterns of 
change across program groups and impairments are much less evident 
than application patterns. Across program groups, the change ranges 
from 5.9 percentage points for SSI-only to 4.6 percentage points for 
Dl-concurrent. The increase in the allowance rate is greatest in the 
mental illness and circulatory impairment categories for all three pro-




















































































SOURCE- SSA, Disability Research File, and Lewm-VHI calculations.
NOTE: Dl-only and Dl-concurrent applications sum to total DI applications, but SSI-only and Dl-concurrent applications do not sum to total SSI applica 
tions All data are for adults age 18-64 See the text for further discussion.

















































































































SOURCE- SSA, Disability Research File, and Lewm-VHI calculations.
NOTE: Dl-only and Dl-concurrdnt applications sum to total DI applications, but SSI-only and Dl-concurrent applications do not sum to total SSI applica 




































































































































































































w x o| *+ N> CfQ 3 T3 00
 
OO
44 Stapleton, Coleman, Dietrich, and Livermore
gram groups. For other impairment groups, the change varies consider 
ably across program groups.
While allowance rate increases were greatest in the mental illness 
category in general, increases varied substantially across subcategories 
(Exhibit 2.6). The largest increases by far were for addiction disor 
ders approximately 20 percentage points in each of the three program 
groups. The next highest increases were for anxiety disorders  
approximately 10 percentage points in each program group.
METHODOLOGY
The findings reported on here are primarily based on two sets of 
econometric models that were estimated with the state-level data 
described in the previous section. The first set uses 1980-1993 initial 
determination and allowance data, and the second set uses the 1988- 
1992 application and award data. The econometric methodology used is 
essentially the same for both sets. We describe this methodology below, 
discuss the main explanatory variables used in the analysis, and 
describe simulations conducted with the estimated models in order to 
interpret the findings. A more technical description of the econometric 
methodology appears in the appendix to this chapter, along with 
selected regression and simulation results.
The findings reported here also draw on several other activities we 
conducted in order to better design, interpret, and validate the econo 
metric analysis. These include
  a national-level actuarial analysis of the impact of growth and 
changes in the age/sex distribution of the disability insured popu 
lation on DI application and award growth
  a substantial review of relevant literature
  interviews with a series of government and academic experts on 
disability
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  case studies of application and award growth in California, Flor 
ida, New York, Texas, and Michigan
The findings of the case studies are reported more fully in Chapter 8. 
Econometric Model
For the 1980-1993 analysis we estimated a single initial determina 
tion and allowance rate equation for each of three program groups: DI- 
only, concurrent, and SSI-only. 5 The dependent variable in each equa 
tion is the logarithm of either initial determinations per capita or the 
initial allowance rate (initial allowances divided by initial determina 
tions). In assessing the findings from this analysis, it is important to 
keep in mind that children are included in the SSI-only category.
For the 1988-1992 analysis we estimated forty application equa 
tions for each program (DI and SSI). The dependent variable in each 
equation is the logarithm of either an application or incidence rate for a 
specific age/sex/impairment group (five age categories, two sex catego 
ries, and four impairment categories). For DI, we also estimated sepa 
rate Dl-only and Dl-concurrent equations. For the award analysis, we 
estimated male and female equations for each program group.
It is important to keep in mind differences in the dependent variable 
data when comparing the findings from the analyses of the two periods. 
Three critical differences are 1) the 1980-1993 data for SSI-only 
include children, while the SSI data for 1988-1992 do not; 2) the 
dynamics of the series are different in a systematic way because of the 
processing lag between the date of application filing and the date the 
initial determinations are made; and 3) awards for the 1988-1992 anal 
ysis include allowances made at all levels, whereas those for the 1980- 
1993 analysis refer to initial allowances only.
Explanatory Variables
Explanatory variables that appear in the final models include
  the expected application rate, based on 1990 national application 
rates by age group and the age-distribution of the state's popula 
tion in the current year to capture the effect of the aging of the 
population
  the unemployment rate to represent the business cycle
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• the labor force participation rate—to capture the negative, cycli 
cal effect of discouraged workers leaving the labor force during 
recessions. For DI, this variable may also capture the long-term 
positive effect of growth in the share of women who are disabil 
ity-insured
• the share of employment in manufacturing—to capture the effect 
of economic restructuring
• GA program cuts—to proxy for the effects of state and local 
shifting efforts (especially for SSI)
• the poverty rate—to capture changes in poverty that are not 
picked up by other variables in the model
• the mean AFDC payment for a two-person household relative to 
mean earnings—to capture the value of AFDC benefits
• the mean SSI payment, including state supplement payments, rel 
ative to mean earnings—to capture the value of SSI benefits
• AIDS/HIV incidence—to account for the effects of the AIDS epi 
demic on the incidence and prevalence of disability
• the number of immigrants granted legal alien status under the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)—unlike most other 
immigrants, those granted legal alien status under IRCA were 
immediately eligible to apply for SSI
• the percentage of children living in single-family homes—to 
proxy for the effects of the number of households headed by sin 
gle parents on applications and awards (particularly for SSI)
• a dummy variable for each year—to control for national factors
There are two important general differences between the explana 
tory variable specifications used for the two sets of analyses. First, for 
the 1988-1992 analysis, which was conducted first, we related current- 
year changes in explanatory variables to current-year changes in appli 
cation and incidence rates. For the 1980-1993 analysis we also exam 
ined the impact of prior year ("lagged") changes in the explanatory 
variables on current-year initial determinations and allowance rates 
and found substantial lagged impacts for two variables: the unemploy 
ment rate and the labor force participation rate. Second, the expected
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application rate was used only in the 1980-1993 analysis in order to 
capture effects of changes in the age distribution of the population. In 
the 1988-1992 analysis these effects were captured through disaggre- 
gation of the analysis by age (as well as sex and impairment).
Other differences in the explanatory variables for the two sets of 
analyses are due to data availability and statistical significance. We 
found that several explanatory variables that were significant for the 
longer period were not significant in the 1988-1992 analysis, appar 
ently because the variability of these variables was low during the 
shorter period.
Simulations
In order to interpret the findings from the econometric analyses, we 
used the estimated models to conduct a number of counterfactual simu 
lations. For the 1980-1993 analysis, we simulated the impact of all 
explanatory variables in the model on initial determinations and allow 
ance rates holding all "national factors" (the factors represented by the 
year variables) constant at their 1989 levels. Comparisons of the simu 
lated and actual series show how much of the historical variation in 
these series is accounted for by the state-level variables and how much 
is left unaccounted for—due to national factors as well as to state-level 
factors that were not fully captured in the analysis. For initial determi 
nations, we also compare the simulated and actual series to expected 
initial determinations; i.e., to the estimate of the number of applica 
tions expected based on national application rates by program and age 
for 1990 and the current year population in the state by age.
For the 1988-1992 analysis, we simulated the impact of the 1988- 
1992 change in each individual explanatory variable on application and 
award growth, holding all other variables constant at their 1988 levels. 
This was supplemented with the findings from the national-level actu 
arial analysis of the disability-insured population to get estimates of 
the marginal impact of the growth in the share of the working-age pop 
ulation (especially women) that is disability-insured.
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POPULATION CHANGES
Population growth
Changes in the size and age/gender composition of the population 
provide the simplest and most direct explanation of changes in the 
number of DI and SSI applications and awards. The size of the work 
ing-age "SSA area" population grew steadily from 1975 to 1992 and is 
expected to continue growing steadily in the near future. The baby 
boom generation, born between 1946 and 1964, was still entering the 
working-age population in 1975. As it did, the average age of the work 
ing-age population declined, but this decline was eventually reversed 
as the generation aged. Both the growth in the size of the working-age 
population and the aging of the baby boom generation have contributed 
substantially to recent growth in applications and awards for SSA's dis 
ability programs.
The SSA area population between the ages of 15 and 64 grew at an 
average annual rate of 1.1 percent from 1975 to 1992, but the growth in 
recent years has been much slower than in earlier years. From 1975 to 
1980 the average annual growth rate was 1.5 percent, while it was only 
0.6 percent from 1988 to 1992. During the later period, however, 
changes in the age distribution of the working-age population substan 
tially offset the effect of slowing population growth.
The expected initial determination variables used in the 1980-1993 
analysis are intended to capture the combined effects of growth and 
aging of the population on initial determinations. The contribution of 
these variables to the acceleration in application and award growth 
experienced from 1988 on can be seen by comparing their annual 
growth for the latter period to their annual growth in the 1980-1988 
period. For all three program groups, this variable grows at a faster 
annual rate from 1988 to 1993 than from 1980 to 1988. For Dl-only, 
the annual rate of growth increases from 0.8 percent to 1.3 percent; for 
concurrent, the increase is from 1.3 to 1.4 percent; and for SSI-only, 
the increase is from 0.6 to 1.2 percent. The very small increase for the 
concurrent category is apparently explained by the fact that a relatively 
large share of applicants in the concurrent category are young. Thus, 
these factors help explain the acceleration in growth in the Dl-only and
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SSI-only categories, but not in the concurrent category. It should also 
be noted that the acceleration in the growth rates of these variables 
themselves occurred before 1988, and thus does not coincide with the 
acceleration of applications that began in 1989.
Target populations
The number of DI and SSI applications and awards should be influ 
enced by changes in the size of the population eligible for either or 
both programs, i.e., each program's target population. The most impor 
tant eligibility factors are the presence of qualifying disabilities and 
economic eligibility. The disability criteria are identical for the two 
programs, while economic eligibility is tied to disability-insured status 
for DI and to a means test for SSI. For simplicity of discussion, those 
satisfying the SSI means test will be called "poor" below, although the 
official poverty population is an imperfect proxy for SSI eligibility. 
Our focus here is on exogenous changes in the size of the relevant tar 
get populations given program rules; we defer the discussion of supply 
factors affecting the size and composition of the eligible population 
until later.
The three program groups can be visualized as being determined by 
various combinations of the target populations defined by disability- 
insured status, meeting the SSI means test, and having a qualifying dis 
ability. To be eligible for DI, a person has to satisfy the insured status 
and disability requirements. SSI eligibility requires meeting the means 
test and the disability requirement. Persons with qualifying disabilities 
who are disability-insured but not poor are eligible for DI only, those 
who are poor qualify for both programs (concurrent eligibility), and 
those who are poor but not disability insured are eligible for SSI only.
Existing data do not permit observation of trends in the three main 
target populations directly, and indeed not even cross-sectional data are 
available on a reasonable proxy of the population satisfying the disabil 
ity criteria in the general population. Therefore we must rely on an 
item-by-item examination of evidence on trends in these three target 
populations.
Based on estimates from SSA's actuaries, the share of the population 
that is disability-insured grew at an average annual rate of 1.2 percent 
from 1975 to 1992. The rate of growth was much higher for women
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(2.6 percent) than for men (0.2 percent), reflecting growth of female 
labor force participation rates. The narrowing of gender differences 
also suggests that this source of growth is approaching exhaustion.
We performed an actuarial analysis of the contribution of growth 
and changes in the age and gender distribution of the disability insured 
population on DI applications from 1988 to 1992 and found an average 
annual contribution of 2.1 percentage points. This is almost 0.8 per 
centage points greater than the estimated impact of population growth 
and aging alone, with almost all of the added contribution due to 
changes in the disability-insured status of women. Results for awards 
were almost identical. It is important to note that the growth in the pro 
portion of the disability-insured population suggests an increase in the 
share of SSI eligibles concurrently qualifying for DI, thereby depress 
ing the growth of the SSI-only group, particularly for women.
Change in the age and gender composition of the disability-insured 
population will also have an impact on application growth in specific 
impairment categories. The large increase in the proportion of the pop 
ulation in their thirties and forties suggests a corresponding increase in 
disability applications based on impairments most likely to occur in 
middle age, and less growth for impairments that typically occur either 
earlier or later in life. Our actuarial analysis of DI application growth 
from 1988 to 1992 found that growth due to change in the disability- 
insured population was greatest in the musculoskeletal impairment cat 
egory, and smallest for the internal organ category. These findings are a 
result of the fact that applications based on musculoskeletal impair 
ment (most commonly back strains and injuries) represent a larger 
share of applications among younger and middle-aged applicants than 
among older applicants. Applications in internal organ categories 
(heart disease, respiratory disease, cancer, etc.) are a larger share of 
applications from older persons, which partially accounts for the rela 
tively slow growth rate in the internal organ category.
From 1979 to 1992 the poverty rate for the working-age population 
grew at an average annual rate of 1.6 percent. Growth was highest for 
persons age 18 to 24 and in the subperiods 1979-1983 and 1988-1992, 
both periods of slow economic growth or even decline; in the latter 
period, the average annual growth rate of the pretransfer poverty rate 
was 3.5 percent. If we assume that increases in the poverty rate directly 
translate into increases in SSI applications on top of the effects of pop-
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ulation growth and aging, these factors together account for 4.7 per 
centage points of the average annual growth in SSI applications over 
this period, or about 45 percent of the average annual growth of 10.5 
percent.
We included the poverty rate as an explanatory variable in our SSI 
regressions, but found in general that it did not have a statistically sig 
nificant effect on applications and awards; marginally significant, posi 
tive coefficients were obtained in analysis of initial determination data 
for the 1980-1987 subperiod alone. The weak findings might be attrib 
utable to substantial measurement errors in state-level poverty rate esti 
mates. Another explanation is that important determinants of the 
poverty rate, especially unemployment and the age distribution of the 
population, are included separately in all of the analyses, so only varia 
tion in the poverty rate that is not explained by other explanatory vari 
ables is being used to identify the impact of poverty.
One of the other determinants of poverty is the growth in the num 
ber of female-headed households. We included the percent of children 
living with only one parent to capture this factor. More generally, this 
variable serves as a proxy for changes in family structure that could 
have an impact on applications, especially declines in marriage rates 
that have left many individuals with limited family sources of financial, 
in-kind, and emotional support. In the 1988-1992 analysis this variable 
was very significant for the SSI and Dl-concurrent equations for both 
men and women. We found that this variable accounts for about 5 per 
cent of annual SSI application growth during the period. Effects were 
somewhat larger for women than for men, were larger for younger age 
groups than for older age groups, and were concentrated in the mental 
disorders category. We also found strong evidence of a positive impact 
on initial determinations in the SSI-only and concurrent categories. 6
These findings suggest that declines in the availability of financial, 
in-kind, and emotional support from spouses are making a substantial 
contribution to growth in applications and awards. They also help 
explain the rapid growth in the mental impairment category. A negative 
association between severe mental illness and marriage has been docu 
mented in the mental health literature; empirical evidence shows that 
individuals who are mentally ill are less likely to marry than others, 
and are more likely to get divorced if they do marry (see B artel and 
Taubman 1986). Thus, the prevalence of mental illness is relatively
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high in the population that is "on the margin" of marriage, so declines 
in marriage may result in more applications from this group. It could 
also be that expanded availability of disability benefits for those with a 
mental illness has contributed to the decline in marriage rates, by offer 
ing an alternative source of support to some who would otherwise be 
married.
The data available to study the prevalence of disabling health condi 
tions is limited, especially for analyzing trends. Long-term trends in 
the prevalence of disabling conditions may be influencing long-term 
growth in applications and awards (in some cases negatively), but with 
one exception (AIDS/HIV) we did not find convincing evidence of 
health trends explaining the recent acceleration of application and 
award growth. The incidence of AIDS/HIV grew at an annual rate of 
9.3 percent from 1988 to 1992. Our regression estimates for 1988- 
1992 along with counts of the number of applications in the AIDS/HIV 
impairment category suggest that AIDS/HIV accounts for between 0.6 
and 0.9 percentage points of both DI and SSI application growth over 
this period.
SSI applications from legal aliens and those living in the United 
States under the color of law grew much more rapidly than those from 
citizens from 1988 to 1992—at an average annual rate of 17.4 percent 
versus 9.8 percent for citizens—although the share of all applications 
that are from this group is still small (6.8 percent in 1992). We previ 
ously have hypothesized that the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986 (IRCA) explained the relatively rapid growth among applica 
tions from this population. National time-series of IRCA legalizations 
show a striking resemblance to national time-series for SSI applica 
tions from legal aliens (Lewin-VHI 1994). Because IRCA legalizations 
are concentrated in a relatively few states, we expected that any impact 
of IRCA legalizations would be clearly distinguished in the application 
and award analysis for 1988-1992. In fact, however, the findings were 
very weak. To verify the econometric findings, we asked SSA to tabu 
late the number of annual SSI awards to IRCA immigrants in a 10 per 
cent sample of all SSI applications for the period from 1989 (the first 
year of IRCA legalizations) to 1993. The number identified as IRCA 
immigrants turned out to be very small—peaking at an estimated 3,200 
of the 88,500 applications from all legal aliens in 1993. 7 Thus, the rapid 
growth in legal alien applications over this period appears to be primar-
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ily due to the same factors that are behind growth in applications from 
citizens. While applications from legal aliens grew at a somewhat 
faster rate than those from citizens, evidence from the case studies sug 
gests that this is because the recession had a larger impact on legal 
aliens than on citizens.
Thus, IRCA is apparently not responsible for the relatively rapid 
growth of applications from noncitizens. In the analysis of the 1980- 
1993 data we examined whether growth in the number of legalized 
immigrants who have satisfied the three-year waiting period could 
explain this phenomenon, but again found no significant results. Evi 
dence from the case studies (Chapter 9) suggests that the recession had 
a much larger impact on the immigrant population than on citizens, but 
we have not tested this hypothesis empirically. It is also known that 
middleman fraud has played a role in helping immigrants in some 
areas obtain awards, but the extent of the fraud is not known. 8
An important feature of our findings concerning population factors 
is that they explain why growth in concurrent applications and awards 
has been greater than growth in applications and awards for either pro 
gram alone, and especially why concurrent application and award 
growth has greatly exceeded that in the Dl-only category. Female and 
young DI applicants are more likely to meet the SSI means test than 
older male DI applicants, and growth in the disability insured popula 
tion has been greatest for women and for young to middle-age groups. 
The effects of poverty and changes in family structure have roughly 
equal impacts on concurrent and SSI-only applications and awards, but 
at most small impacts on Dl-only applications and awards. Finally, the 
effect of AIDS/HIV on concurrent applications and awards has been 
substantially greater than its effects on those in either the Dl-only or 
SSI-only categories.
BUSINESS CYCLES AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING
Regression Estimates of Business Cycle Effects
There have been numerous previous econometric studies estimating 
the effect of the business cycle on DI applications, awards, and case-
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loads. Most of the previous studies used aggregate time-series meth 
ods, although some work has been conducted using state- or 
individual-level cross-sectional estimates (see Exhibit 1.2 in Chapter 1, 
pp. 15-16). The point estimates vary across individual studies, but no 
study finds substantial effects in a direction opposite from the predic 
tions of economic theory. Previous studies have suffered from various 
specification problems, low statistical power, or both.
One of the key results from our work using annual pooled cross-sec 
tion/time-series data for states relates to our estimates of business cycle 
effects. Our ability to control for permanent differences among the 
states and to eliminate the confounding effect of national changes 
endemic to time-series studies makes the results obtained from our 
analysis methodologically much stronger and more credible. Strong 
results were found in both the 1980-1993 analysis of initial determina 
tions and the 1988-1992 analysis of applications (see Exhibit 1.2 in 
Chapter 1). In general we found stronger effects for DI than for SSI 
and for initial determinations and applications than for initial allow 
ances and final awards. The estimated effects on allowance rates are 
negative.
In the 1980-1993 analysis of initial determinations we found that the 
impact of a change in unemployment begins in the year of the change, 
but is greatest two years after the change. Such "lagged" effects are pre 
sumably greater for initial determinations than for applications because 
of the substantial lag between filing and the initial determination, but 
nonetheless could be very significant. We did not examine lagged 
effects in the 1988-1992 application analysis, and this may explain the 
somewhat stronger findings in the 1980-1993 analysis.
We were also able to extend our DI initial determination analysis 
back to 1976, and found remarkably stable unemployment effects for 
DI in each of three subperiods: 1976-1979, 1980-1987, and 1988- 
1993 (see the appendix to this chapter). We also found that unemploy 
ment effects for SSi-only initial determinations were essentially as 
large as for Dl-only and concurrent initial determinations in the 1980- 
1987 period, whereas we found no unemployment effect for SSI-only 
initial determinations in the 1988-1993 period. The difference may be 
related to the fact that the SSI-only data include children, and growth 
in this category during the latter period is dominated by growth for 
children.
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In the initial determination analysis we also found evidence of a 
"discouraged worker" effect—holding the unemployment rate con 
stant, a decline in labor force participation as individuals give up their 
search for work during a recession is associated with a significant 
increase in initial determinations.
Simulated Business Cycle Effects
One especially notable finding in the simulations for the 1980-1993 
period is that the short recession of 1980 combined with the more 
severe recession of 1981-1982 had a large impact on initial determina 
tions during that period, even though initial determinations declined 
(Exhibit 2.7). 9
Tightening of eligibility standards during that period (see p. 63, The 
Supply of Benefits) evidently discouraged applications sufficiently to 
more than offset the impact of the recession. According to the simula 
tions, the effect of the 1981-1982 recession was much larger than the 
substantial simulated effect for the 1990-1991 recession.
Based on simulations using the 1988-1992 model estimates, 
changes in the unemployment rate over this period account for substan 
tial fractions of the total growth in applications, especially for DI. 
Changes in unemployment account for 1.7 percentage points of the 8.9 
percentage point annual growth in total DI applications, a 19 percent 
share. For SSI, changes in the unemployment rate account for 1.1 per 
centage points of the 10.5 percentage point annual growth rate, a 10 
percent share.
Changes in the unemployment rate account for much more of the 
growth in DI and SSI applications for men than for women from 1988 
to 1992. For example, the unemployment rate accounts for 2.2 percent 
age points of the 7.9 percentage point annual increase in total DI appli 
cations by men, a 28 percent share, but only 0.9 percentage points of 
the 10.5 percentage point annual increase in total DI applications by 
women, a 9 percent share. One reason changes in the unemployment 
rate account for a greater share of the total growth in DI applications 
by men is because the models do not take into account changes in the 
disability-insured population. It is likely that this omission results in an 
underestimate of the effect of the unemployment rate on DI applica 
tions by women.










1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Simulated3 Actual Actual (adults only)
SOURCE Lewm-VHI analysis of SSA data on initial disability determinations.
aThe simulated series is based on regression results reported in Exhibit IV.A 1, and shows the path initial determinations would have
followed had they been affected solely by state-level factors The actual and simulated series are normalized to equal one another in 1989
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In award simulations for 1988-1992, the unemployment rate 
accounts for 1.0 percentage points of the 10.0 percent annual growth of 
DI awards and 0.7 percentage points of the 12.0 percent annual growth 
of SSI awards, respectively; i.e., it accounts for 10 percent of DI award 
growth and 6 percent of SSI growth. These findings, and the findings 
from the 1980-1993 analysis of initial allowances, indicate that the 
marginal applicant who is induced to apply by a recession is less likely 
to obtain an award than the average applicant. Put another way, the 
recessions have a negative effect on allowance rates. This finding is 
especially important in view of the large increases in allowance rates 
that were observed during and shortly after the 1990-1991 recession. 
We return to this point later.
The findings from the five case studies add credibility to the econo 
metric findings about business cycles, suggesting, if anything, that they 
are conservative. It is clear from the case studies that subtleties of busi 
ness cycles not captured by the unemployment rate are relevant to a 
recession's impact—the industrial distribution of job losses, the per 
ceived permanence of layoffs, and key characteristics of workers who 
lose their jobs (age, sex, prior earnings, skills, etc.). In effect, the 
unemployment rate is a crude proxy for the business cycle. As is well 
known by statisticians, estimated effects that rely on proxy variables 
tend to understate the effect of the factor they are meant to capture.
We know relatively little about the mechanisms through which busi 
ness cycles have an impact on program growth. We cannot determine, 
for instance, the extent to which our results reflect the effects of state 
and local fiscal responses to recessions as opposed to job losses and 
pay reductions among workers with serious disabilities or spouses of 
persons with serious disabilities. The weaker findings for SSI-only 
applications and awards suggest, however, that much of the effect is 
due to job losses. Findings from the case studies support that interpre 
tation as well, but they also provide evidence of a significant role for 
state and local fiscal responses to revenue losses, a subject we will 
return to later.
The dynamic aspects of business cycle impacts are also poorly 
understood. The considerable lagged effects found in the initial deter 
mination analysis suggest that many individuals who are induced to 
apply by a recession only do so after an extensive search for other 
sources of support.
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Economic Restructuring
Many have hypothesized that economic restructuring—the replace 
ment of high-paying manufacturing jobs with relatively low-paying 
service sector jobs—has had an impact on application and award 
growth. The short-term effect of economic restructuring is thought to 
be positive, because disabled workers who lose their manufacturing 
jobs may choose to apply for disability benefits rather than find new 
work in the service sector. The long-term effect may be negative, how 
ever, because service sector workers are less susceptible to disabling 
injuries and illnesses (see Loprest, Rupp, and Sandell 1995). The long- 
term effect may vary by impairment group; for instance, some have 
suggested that it is negative for physical impairments but positive for 
mental impairments.
We have previously speculated that the large business cycle effects 
found in the 1988-1992 application analysis may partly reflect the 
short-term, positive impact of economic restructuring (Lewin-VHI 
1995b). In the 1980-1993 initial determination analysis we tried to 
capture this effect using the percent of employment in manufacturing 
as an additional explanatory variable. We did find the expected nega 
tive effect for the Dl-only category, but it was small and not replicated 
for other program categories. We also developed two indices of job- 
related injuries and illnesses to capture the longer-term impact of eco 
nomic restructuring, but found no significant results. While it may be 
that measurement and other specification errors account for the insig 
nificant findings, it would appear that business cycle effects overwhelm 
the effects of economic restructuring in the periods we have examined.
OTHER SUPPORT PROGRAMS
The Potential for Program Interactions
Just as economic theory suggests that the relative value of disability 
cash benefits to potential earnings affects the decision to apply, it is 
reasonable to expect that the availability and relative value of benefits 
through other programs should also affect the decision to apply. This is
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an important topic, particularly in light of substantial secular changes 
in the relative value of public benefits such as General Assistance 
(GA—the generic term for welfare programs funded entirely by state 
and local governments), Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC—a state/federal program that primarily provides support for 
low-income single-parent households), Medicaid, and Medicare.
Other programs can be classified as either "substitutes" or "comple 
ments" for DI and/or SSI, in the economic sense of these terms. Substi 
tute programs are those for which an expansion in the value of benefits 
reduces applications and awards for the SSA programs; benefit expan 
sion for complementary programs increases applications and awards. 
GA and AFDC are examples of substitute programs for SSI; individu 
als who receive SSI benefits are not eligible for GA or AFDC. Tighten 
ing of eligibility rules and reductions in benefits for GA or AFDC are 
expected to increase SSI participation. State supplements to SSI are 
clear complements to SSI; reductions in state supplements are 
expected to reduce SSI participation.
Medicaid and Medicare are also complements of SSI and DI, 
respectively; most SSI recipients are automatically eligible for Medic- 
aid, while DI beneficiaries receive Medicare coverage after a two-year 
waiting period. Increases in the cash value of Medicaid and Medicare 
benefits increase the relative attractiveness of the disability programs, 
and hence the demand for their benefits. Changes in eligibility rules for 
other programs can change the degree to which they are substitutes or 
complements for the SSA disability programs. For example, expansion 
of Medicaid to individuals who are not sufficiently poor to qualify for 
SSI, or the introduction of universal health insurance coverage, would 
reduce or eliminate the complementarity between medical insurance 
and income support programs.
General Assistance and Aid to Families with Dependent Children
In our state-level analysis for the 1988 to 1992 period we found 
strong evidence of effects of cuts in state and local GA programs on 
both applications and awards. GA cuts in seven states and the District 
of Columbia had highly significant, positive effects on SSI applications 
and awards for both men and women, and for concurrent applications 
and awards among men. Estimated effects on applications and awards
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were nearly identical, and the elasticities were often large, particularly 
for younger men, and especially for applications and awards in the 
mental disorders category. We later found similar results for initial 
determinations in both the 1980-1987 and 1988-1993 periods. For the 
1980-1987 period we also found evidence that reductions in AFDC 
benefits increase SSI-only initial determinations, but these findings 
were not replicated in the 1988-1993 analysis. The lack of findings for 
the later period may simply reflect a lack of large changes in AFDC 
benefits, the dominance of growth in initial determinations for chil 
dren, and/or the confounding effects of Zebley and the new mental dis 
order listings for children.
These findings are the only direct econometric evidence we are 
aware of demonstrating that changes in other income and in-kind trans 
fer programs have an impact on SSI applications and awards, but the 
lack of evidence may simply reflect the difficulty of measuring such 
effects. The lack of evidence may also reflect a widely prevailing view 
that anyone who is eligible for SSI as well as either AFDC or GA 
would already have applied for SSI because SSI benefits are greater. As 
several welfare administrators and other welfare experts have told us, 
however, this reasoning neglects the fact that the SSI application and 
appeals process is prohibitively difficult for many who can much more 
readily qualify for GA or AFDC—especially those with mental disor 
ders.
A primary objective of the case studies was to learn more about the 
impact of changes in state and local welfare programs on SSI applica 
tions and awards. As described in detail in Chapter 8 of this volume, 
we found that cuts in GA benefits during the 1988-1992 period repre 
sent only a fraction of state and local efforts to shift welfare recipi 
ents—primarily GA recipients—onto SSI. It appears that the 
econometric models may substantially understate the impact of the 
combination of GA cuts and other state and local shifting efforts. The 
reason for this is methodologically the same as the reason that our 
business cycle estimates may understate the magnitude of business 
cycle effects: the GA cuts variable used for the analysis is a crude 
proxy for general state and local efforts; its estimated coefficient prob 
ably understates the impacts of these changes because it fails to capture 
the effects of shifting efforts that don't involve cuts in GA benefits.
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While the findings from the case studies and econometric analysis 
provide much less support for the impact of AFDC benefit changes on 
SSI, the AFDC findings for 1980-1987 along with the long-term 
decline in the value of AFDC benefits relative to SSI benefits (from 
1975 to 1992 the level of median AFDC benefits for a family of four 
declined by 37 percent relative to the value of federal SSI benefits for 
couples), and evidence that a substantial share of AFDC mothers have 
disabilities (see Adler 1993), suggest that AFDC program changes 
have contributed to long-term SSI application and award growth. Pro 
posed future reforms to both AFDC and GA programs could have a 
substantial positive impact on SSI caseloads.
As stated above, the econometric analysis for the 1988-1992 period 
shows that GA cuts had an especially strong impact on applications 
and awards in the mental impairment category. Evidence from our 
interviews of DDS administrators and the case studies supports this 
finding and suggests that, in general, state and local shifting efforts 
over this period can help explain the exceptionally rapid application 
and award growth in the mental impairment categories. Several people 
we interviewed argued that the success of state and local shifting 
efforts would not have been possible were it not for the changes in eli 
gibility requirements for mental disorders.
State SSI Supplements
Many states supplement federal SSI benefits with a state payment. 
We expect increases in total benefits (state plus federal) relative to 
earnings to increase applications. In the 1980-1993 analysis of initial 
determinations, we used the sum of the federal payment and state sup 
plements to individuals living independently divided by earnings per 
worker in the state as an explanatory variable in the S Si-only and con 
current initial determination equations.
The findings were quite strong. We estimate that the elasticity of 
SSI-only initial determinations with respect to the sum of the state and 
federal benefit is 0.8. This estimate is very significant statistically and 
is robust to the subperiod used. 10 For concurrent initial determinations 
the point estimate of the elasticity is smaller (0.4) and is less robust to 
the choice of subperiod, but is still significant. 11
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Medicaid
We also attempted to estimate the impact of the rising value of Med 
icaid benefits on SSI applications and awards, but were not successful 
in identifying an impact. It seems likely, however, that the absence of a 
positive finding reflects the difficulty of measuring the value of the 
benefits. Welfare administrators and other experts generally attest to 
the importance of Medicaid benefits to SSI applicants, and recent 
research on the related topics of "continuation of coverage" mandates 
(Gruber and Madrian 1993), and the effects of Medicaid on AFDC 
caseloads (Moffit and Wolfe 1992; Congressional Budget Office 1993; 
Yelowitz 1994) confirm the importance of medical benefits to labor 
force and program participation decisions. In addition, as discussed 
further in Chapter 9, the growing burden of health care costs for indi 
gent patients on state and local governments and health care providers 
is an important factor behind state and local shifting efforts.
Medicaid reform or general health care reform could have a signifi 
cant impact on SSI caseloads. Medicaid block grants, which would 
result in federal payments to states that are not tied directly to Medic- 
aid enrollment, would significantly reduce the incentives to shift state 
and local welfare recipients onto SSI. Cutbacks in Medicaid benefits 
could also have a negative effect. Making Medicaid benefits available 
to disabled persons independently of SSI, or otherwise increasing their 
access to health insurance, would also be likely to reduce SSI caseload 
growth.
THE SUPPLY OF BENEFITS
Features of SSA's disability programs such as the real value of bene 
fits, legislative and administrative actions affecting eligibility determi 
nation, work incentive provisions, and SSA outreach activities might 
substantially affect applications and awards. Other supply factors, such 
as court decisions on appealed cases, also play a role. Research on the 
effects of these factors is extremely difficult to perform for three rea 
sons: there is only limited variation in the data; most changes that do 
occur tend to affect the whole program, precluding natural comparison
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groups; and it is extremely difficult to disentangle the effect of pro 
grammatic factors from potential confounding factors.
In this section we first briefly discuss the contributions of our work 
to existing literature on the impact of increases in the value of benefits 
and on exogenous shifts in denial rates. We then turn to a more in- 
depth discussion of supply changes that occurred from 1980 to 1993 
and evidence from our simulations concerning their collective impact.
The Value of Benefits
Previous econometric work has addressed some programmatic fac 
tors. Most important, there is a considerable body of econometric work 
since the pioneering work of Parsons (1980) and Leonard (1984) 
focusing on the effect of wage replacement rates on labor force and 
disability program participation. This body of econometric work has 
been plagued by serious identification problems, and has produced a 
wide range of estimates. An alternative quasi-experimental approach 
using rejected applicants as a comparison group (Bound 1989) raised 
fundamental questions about the validity of these estimates, but relies 
on somewhat questionable assumptions as well.
With one exception, we did not analyze the impact of changes in the 
value of benefits because benefits only change at the federal level, i.e., 
the value of federal benefits is a national factor that does not vary at the 
state level. The exception is the estimated positive effect on SSI initial 
determinations of the sum of federal and state SSI benefits relative to 
earnings, discussed in the previous section. The effect estimated is 
identified only through variation in the value of the state benefit and 
variation in earnings. Hence, caution should be exercised in using it to 
infer the effect of a change in the federal benefit on initial determina 
tions.
Denial Rates
Economic theory suggests that the expected probability of award 
and future benefit streams should affect applications, and therefore 
changed eligibility rules and their enforcement might be important in 
determining the number of applicants. Two pioneering studies on this 
issue used state-level analysis for the 1970s that is similar methodolog-
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ically to our own analysis for later years. These studies focused on the 
impact of changes in initial denial rates on DI applications and labor 
force participation, taking advantage of what appears to have been 
exogenous changes in state denial rates from 1978 to 1979. Parsons 
(1991) estimated that a 10 percent administrative increase in denial 
rates reduces applications by 4.5 percent. One limitation of Parson's 
work is that he did not control for changes in unemployment or demo 
graphics at the state level during this period. Gruber and Kubik (1995) 
use data from the same period to estimate the impact of denial rate 
changes on labor force participation of individuals with chronic health 
conditions. They did control for demographic change and the unem 
ployment rate, and also found significant effects. We were able to repli 
cate Parsons' findings exactly, and to test the robustness of his results 
in models in which we also controlled for demographic and business 
cycle effects. We found that taking these factors into account reduces 
the estimated effect of denial rate increases by 50 percent, but the esti 
mated effects were still very significant. We also assessed the validity 
of Parsons' assumption that reductions in the denial rate from 1977 to 
1978 reflected state DDS tightening of eligibility standards; if reduc 
tions in denial rates were due to other factors, then it is not clear that 
potential applicants and advocates would regard them to be indicators 
of changes in eligibility standards. We found that lagged denial rates 
had only very weak, insignificant coefficients in DI initial determina 
tion models estimated for later years, which is consistent with Parsons' 
assumption about the reasons for denial rate changes- from 1977 to 
1978.
Our econometric analysis of state data did not provide other direct 
evidence of program supply effects, by design. Despite this, it is possi 
ble to make some inferences concerning the effects of supply changes 
indirectly. In the remainder of this section we develop such inferences 
about supply changes that have occurred since 1980.
Analysis of Supply Changes, 1980-89
Description of the Changes
The 1980 and 1981 Amendments to the Social Security Act reduced 
DI benefits for some workers, introduced new work incentive provi 
sions for DI and SSI, and required SSA to tighten adjudications. 12 In
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some ways these changes codified or extended earlier administrative 
changes aimed at slowing the growth of the programs. The amend 
ments set the stage for substantial administrative tightening of the eli 
gibility standards for claims filed in the next two years, as well as for 
aggressive efforts to remove persons who did not meet the tightened 
interpretation of the eligibility standards from the roles through con 
tinuing disability reviews (CDRs). This was followed by widespread 
criticism of the loss of eligibility for many, particularly those with 
mental impairments who were disproportionately affected by the 
changes. This criticism eventually resulted in a moratorium on CDRs 
in 1984 and the 1984 amendments to the Act.
The 1984 amendments called for new mental impairment criteria 
that reduced the weight given to diagnostic or medical factors and put a 
greater weight on functional factors, such as the degree to which the 
applicant is limited with respect to activities of daily living, social rela 
tions, concentration, persistence and pace, and ability to function in 
work or work-like settings. In 1985, SSA published revised listings of 
mental impairments for adults in order to comply with the amend 
ments.
The 1984 amendments also required that "source evidence"—evi 
dence provided by an applicant's own physician or other health care 
provider (e.g., psychologist)—be considered first, prior to the results of 
an SSA consultative examination. This had the effect of substantially 
increasing the weight given to source evidence. The amendments also 
required that due consideration be given to pain and other symptoms. 
Pain had previously been an important factor in many decisions, but 
concerns raised by litigation, advocates, and even SSA led Congress to 
codify and reaffirm SSA's existing policy. Litigation over specific 
guidelines for the consideration of pain continued after 1984. SSA has 
now promulgated detailed regulations spelling out how symptoms are 
to be evaluated. The new regulations also have special significance for 
mental illnesses because consideration of mental symptoms, such as 
anxiety and depression, is important in many cases.
Another change required by the 1984 amendments is often men 
tioned along with changes in the treatment of source evidence and pain 
and other symptoms: a change in the treatment of multiple nonsevere 
impairments. Prior to the amendments, applicants were automatically 
denied awards in the initial determination if all impairments were
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judged to be nonsevere, even if there were several; unlike in cases of 
impairments that are severe, but do not meet or exceed the listings, 
assessments of the effects of multiple "not severe" impairments were 
not individualized. The change in the law stopped these automatic 
denials. A final change brought about by the 1984 amendments was the 
establishment of a medical improvement standard. Benefits could no 
longer be terminated without substantial evidence of medical improve 
ment in the beneficiary's condition.
The legislative and administrative changes that surrounded the 1984 
amendments were in part instigated by, and accompanied by, court 
decisions that required SSA to be less restrictive in making eligibility 
determinations. In Mental Health Association of Minnesota v. Sch- 
weiker, a 1982 class action suit on behalf of persons with severe mental 
illness in SSA's Chicago region whose benefits had been denied or ter 
minated because of alleged administrative changes in the evaluation of 
mental impairments, the plaintiffs charged that the Chicago region 
DDS offices were not applying the decision-making process called for 
in the regulations. Claimants with mental impairments who did not 
meet the listings were presumed to be able to engage in unskilled work. 
The judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring SSA's policy to be 
"arbitrary, capricious, irrational, and an abuse of discretion" (National 
Academy of Social Insurance 1994). A similar suit was brought by the 
City of New York against SSA in 1983, ending in a decision favoring 
the plaintiff and declaring that such a policy was illegal.
The Effects of the Supply Changes
The 15.4 percent decline in total initial determinations that occurred 
from 1980 to 1982 is usually attributed to the supply tightening that 
occurred during this period. That is, potential applicants were discour 
aged from applying by reductions in benefits and the tightening of eli 
gibility. The 10.7 percent increase in initial determinations from 1984 
to 1986 is attributed to the changes surrounding the 1984 amendments, 
while the 4.9 percent decline in initial determinations from 1987 to 
1989 is attributed to the ending of their initial impact; i.e., the "pool" of 
potential applicants who were affected by the changes was presumably 
depleted.
The initial determination simulations provide strong evidence that 
the effects of the supply changes on application growth during this
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period were even greater than the large swings in initial determination 
growth indicate because the state-level factors in our models had large, 
countervailing effects on initial determination growth (Exhibit 2.7). In 
particular, if it were not for the short recession of 1980 and the more 
substantial recession of 1981-1982, the swings in initial determination 
growth would have been even larger. The simulations imply that total 
initial determinations would have dropped by 28.8 percent from 1980 
to 1982, instead of the actual 15.4 percent drop, if the unemployment 
rate and other explanatory variables in the model had remained at their 
1980 values. Analogously, the increase in initial determinations from 
1984 to 1986 would have been 16.8 percent instead of 10.7 percent. 
Further, the 4.9 percent decline from 1987 to 1989 that is usually 
attributed to the ending of the initial impact of the changes surrounding 
the 1984 amendments is entirely explained by the recovery from the 
recession; had there been no recovery, the model predicts that initial 
determinations would have grown by 0.1 percent.
While the initial determination simulations show that the effects of 
this period's supply changes on initial determinations were much 
greater than previously thought, the initial allowance rate simulations 
show that the impacts of the supply changes on allowances, given 
applications, were not as large as swings in the actual allowance rate 
suggest. The simulations show that changes in other variables during 
this period, especially the unemployment rate, contributed to the 
decline in allowance rates from 1980 to 1982 and also contributed to 
their growth from 1984 to 1986. For instance, the Dl-only simulations 
imply that the initial allowance rate would have fallen by 2.3 percent 
age points from 1980 to 1982 had the state-level explanatory variables 
remained constant over this period, rather than by the actual decline of 
3.7 percentage points; the same rate would have increased by 1.5 per 
centage points from 1984 to 1986 instead of by the actual increase of 
4.1 percentage points. Very similar results were found for the other 
program categories.
To summarize, the findings from our analysis of this period indicate 
that the impacts of historical supply changes on initial determination 
and allowance growth were even greater than previously thought. Fur 
ther, the "indirect" effects of the supply changes on initial allowances 
(i.e., through effects on the number of initial determinations) are much 
more important relative to "direct" effects (i.e., through effects on the
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share of initial determinations that result in initial allowances) than the 
actual initial determination and allowance rate series suggest.
Analysis of Supply Changes, 1989-93
Description of the Changes
Several additional policy changes in the DI and SSI programs 
occurred during the 1989-1993 period that may have affected the sup 
ply of disability benefits. As discussed previously, the 1984 amend 
ments required that source evidence be considered first in the disability 
determination process. In 1991, further regulations regarding source 
evidence were adopted as a result of court challenges to SSA's treat 
ment of source evidence. These regulations stipulated that deference 
must be given to source evidence because of the value of long-standing 
relationships between the patient and the health professional, and more 
weight must be given to source evidence the longer the relationship 
between the health professional and patient, or if the professional is a 
specialist in the relevant area. Further, if the source evidence is not 
accepted, the examiner must explain why.
In 1989 SSA initiated a congressionally mandated SSI outreach pro 
gram. Since 1989, more intensive efforts at outreach have been pursued 
at the local, regional, state, and national levels. More than twenty-five 
cooperative agreements have been awarded for SSI outreach demon 
stration projects, some of which target persons with mental illness and 
homeless persons (Committee on Ways and Means 1994).
Another supply change during the 1989 to 1993 period is the 
marked decrease in the frequency of CDRs. Agency downsizing during 
the 1980s combined with the increased claims workload in the early 
1990s resulted in a reduced allocation of resources to conduct CDRs. 
The proportion of DI beneficiaries leaving the rolls because of medical 
recovery dropped to an all time low of less than 0.5 percent in 1993.
There were very significant SSI supply shifts for children during this 
period, related to the 1990 Supreme Court decision in the case of Sulli 
van v. Zebley and the adoption of new mental disorder listings for chil 
dren in 1991. Even though these supply changes pertain to child 
applications only, it has been suggested that the large impact of the 
decision on DDS and SSA determinations for children spilled over to 
decisions about adults. Because the most significant impacts of these
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changes were on allowances to children with mental disorders, it 
would not be surprising if spillover effects for adult applications were 
primarily in the mental disorder category.
Finally, changes in the adjudicative climate during the 1989 to 1993 
period likely contributed to application and award growth. "Adjudica 
tive climate" refers to the attitudes of state and federal government 
adjudicators. The outcome in a marginal case may hinge on the attitude 
of a state disability determination service adjudicator or an administra 
tive law judge toward the applicant, which may in turn be influenced 
by recent legislation, political and economic conditions, efforts by 
advocacy groups, an SSA commissioner's views, SSA's budgetary out 
look, court decisions, and changes in SSA regulations and policies. 
Some have also argued that adjudicators faced with heavy workloads 
during times of rapid application growth are likely to give questionably 
eligible applicants the benefit of the doubt rather spend additional time 
seeking additional evidence.
While changes in the adjudicative climate cannot be measured 
directly, there is agreement among those familiar with the determina 
tion process that they do occur and play a substantial role. Many 
experts we interviewed believed that there was a significant shift in the 
adjudicative climate in favor of making awards during the 1989 to 
1993 period (see Lewin-VHI 1995a).
In addition to changes that occurred after 1989, the many changes 
that were implemented prior to 1989 may have had a residual impact 
on growth. As noted in the discussion of the initial determination simu 
lations for 1980-1989, the decline in initial determinations from 1987 
to 1989 may have been due to the economic recovery rather than the 
end of the impact of changes surrounding the 1984 amendments. The 
changes created a group of "newly eligibles" who would not have pre 
viously satisfied the disability criteria, including some who had lost 
benefits in the preceding years. Many newly eligible individuals proba 
bly applied for benefits right away, but many others may not have 
applied for benefits because they were either employed, received 
income from some other source, or were not aware of their eligibility. 
Toward the end of the decade, and continuing into the next decade, the 
reasons why some newly eligibles did not apply earlier began to erode: 
the economy deteriorated; many state and local income support pro 
grams were cut; outreach efforts by SSA, state and local governments,
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and private organizations disseminated information about the new rules 
to potentially eligible persons; and state and local governments, advo 
cates, and lawyers learned how to identify potentially eligible individu 
als and help them obtain a favorable decision.
Effects of the Supply Changes
Evidence from Initial Determination and Allowance Simulations. 
The simulations of initial determinations for the period from 1989 to 
1993 show that much of the growth in initial determinations over this 
period is accounted for by unemployment and other state-level explan 
atory variables in the econometric model, but that much remains unac 
counted for. For SSI-only, a large share of the unaccounted for growth 
is clearly due to Zebley and the change in the mental impairment list 
ings for children. Even for DI, however, the growth not accounted for 
by the models is large. From 1989 to 1993 DI initial determinations 
increased by 21.6 percent, an increase that is 15.7 percentage points 
greater than predicted by the econometric models.
The growth in DI initial determinations not accounted for by the 
models' explanatory variables represents an implicit upper bound on 
the effects of supply changes on initial determinations. As discussed 
above, we think that growth not accounted for is partly due to impacts 
of some other factors (the growth in the share of women who are dis 
ability-insured, the business cycle, and state and local shifting efforts 
especially) that are not fully captured in our models. Hence, the unac 
counted for growth in initial determinations may substantially over 
state the impact of supply changes. Nonetheless, it is likely that state- 
level factors cannot account for all of the residual growth.
The initial allowance rate simulations for 1989-1993 provide stron 
ger indirect evidence on the importance of supply changes. The simu 
lations for DI show that the simulated series increased at a rate only 
somewhat lower than the increase in the actual series in 1989 and 
1990, but from 1990 to 1992 the two series moved in opposite direc 
tions—the actual rate for DI increased by 5.4 percentage points, while 
the simulated rate decreased by 0.9 percentage points. It seems likely 
that better measures of state-level factors in the model would increase, 
rather than reduce, the divergence in the actual and simulated series 
because, in general, we have found that such factors have a proportion 
ately smaller impact on allowances than on initial determinations.
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Hence, it is very difficult to explain these divergent paths by factors 
other than supply factors.
The initial allowance rate for DI fell by 5 percentage points from 
1992 to 1993, while the simulated rate fell by only 1 percentage point. 
While it could be that the simulated series understates the negative 
impact of the recession on the allowance rate, we would also expect to 
find a decline in allowance rates after the initial impact of an expansion 
in supply is realized—just as observed in 1986-1987 following the ini 
tial impact of expansions surrounding the 1984 amendments. It is also 
possible that some administrative tightening occurred in 1993 in 
response to concerns over rapid program growth, but we are aware of 
no explicit effort of this sort.
Evidence from Application and Award Simulations. The application 
and award simulations for 1988-1992 provide some additional indirect 
evidence on supply changes during this period. The analysis of appli 
cations, for instance, accounts for more than three quarters of Dl-only 
male application growth between 1988 to 1992, leaving only limited 
room for the net effect of either supply factors or other omitted factors 
on this group. 13 The models did less well in accounting for SSI applica 
tion growth, female application growth, growth in applications from 
those under age 50, and growth in applications in the mental and mus- 
culoskeletal disorder categories.
The fact that almost all of the application growth in the internal 
organs category is accounted for by factors in the model (Exhibit 2.8), 
while the other diagnostic groups show substantial unaccounted for 
growth, is consistent with the hypothesis that regulatory changes such 
as increasing the weight given to pain and other symptoms, increasing 
reliance on source evidence, and broadening the standards' for those 
with mental impairments resulted in substantial application growth 
during this period. One important caution in interpreting the analysis 
of growth not accounted for by impairment is that relatively rapid 
application growth in some categories may simply reflect switching of 
impairment classifications toward categories in which it has become 
easier to obtain an award rather than applications that would not have 
been filed in the absence of supply changes. Thus, for instance, excep 
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may significantly overstate the effects of supply expansions on total 
applications.
As mentioned previously, state and local efforts to shift the burden 
of welfare spending onto the federal government are a significant 
source of the exceptionally high growth in the mental impairment cate 
gory, and we suspect that a significant share of the category growth that 
is not accounted for by other variables is also due to these efforts. The 
effects of state and local efforts on application and award growth are, 
to some degree, inextricable from the effects of supply changes, how 
ever. As mentioned previously, many we have talked to argue that suc 
cessful state and local shifting efforts were in part made possible by 
eligibility changes for mental impairments.
The econometric models also account for much less award growth 
than application growth. In fact, although final allowance rates 
increased over the 1988-1992 period, the models predict that they 
should have declined, just as with our findings for initial allowance 
rates. As in the analysis of initial allowance rates, it is difficult to con 
ceive of an explanation other than a supply expansion for the growth in 
the final allowance rate. The econometric analysis shows that the 
effects on awards of most of the factors analyzed were proportionately 
no larger than their effects on applications, with some (especially the 
unemployment rate) being proportionately smaller. AIDS/HIV may be 
an exception, but this would only apply to the infectious disease cate 
gory.
CONCLUSION
A 1992 report from the Department of Health and Human Services, 
known as the 709 Report, found that the causes of DI program growth 
are many and complex. 14 The evidence we have examined confirms this 
conclusion, but also points to three major causes of the acceleration of 
application and award growth that began in 1989: the recession of 
1990-1991; new and intensified efforts by states and localities to shift 
the burden of welfare spending onto the federal government; and 
expansion in the "supply" of benefits. The relative importance of each 
factor varies by program and is different for applications and awards.
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The recession is apparently more important for DI than SSI, while 
shifting efforts and supply factors are more important for SSI than DI, 
and supply factors are substantially more important for awards than for 
applications. A fourth factor that clearly contributed to the acceleration 
of growth, but to a lesser degree, is the AIDS/HIV epidemic.
The findings imply that the steady economic growth experienced by 
the economy since 1992 is very good news for policymakers worried 
about rapid program growth, especially for DI. This is confirmed by 
the most recent data available on DI application growth (Exhibit 2.9): 
after the growth rate reached a peak of 13.2 percent in 1991, it dropped 
to 1.3 percent in 1994 and was a negative 6.9 percent through the first 
seven months of 1995. These rates compare to expected growth of 2.1 
percent based on changes in the size and age/gender composition of the 
disability insured population alone. We would not be surprised if the 
rate of growth continued to fall because application rates are still well 
above their 1988 level. The bad news is that DI caseloads will continue 
to grow in coming years because many of the large number of persons 
awarded benefits during the recent period are expected to remain on the 
roles for years to come (see Rupp and Scott, Chapter 4).
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SOURCE. SSA Office of Disability and Lewin-VHI calculations.
*The growth rate for 1995 is based on applications in the first seven months of 1995,
compared to the same seven months of 1994.
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The findings add to mounting evidence that economic incentives 
play a critical role in determining whether individuals with disabilities 
participate in the labor force or seek, and perhaps obtain, disability 
benefits. For many people with disabilities, it is not simply a matter of 
whether they can or cannot work because of their disabilities; rather it 
is a matter of whether the rewards to working are sufficient to make 
work more attractive than leaving the labor force and applying for dis 
ability benefits. While it must be recognized that this statement is not 
true for a large number of individuals with disabilities who have virtu 
ally no employment prospects even in a strong economy, the estimated 
magnitude of the impact of recessions on DI applications indicates that 
the statement is true for a large number.
Notes
1. The findings summarized here are compiled from three project reports: Lewin- 
VHI (1995a, 1995b, and 1995c).
2. See Rupp and Stapleton (1995) and Lewm-VHI (1995a) for discussion of earlier 
years.
3. The SSI-only category in the national data excludes SSI applications from indi 
viduals who were eligible for social security benefits in any category, including 
those eligible as DI workers.
4. There are advantages and disadvantages to analyzing awards by "application 
cohort." The primary advantage is that it allows us to examine the allowance rate 
(awards per application filed) for each application cohort within age/gender/pro 
gram groups Aggregate statistics typically compare applications filed in each 
year with awards made in that year. The lag between the filing of an application 
and a final decision may span one or more years. During periods of rapid applica 
tion growth, allowance rates calculated from aggregate data may be greatly dis 
torted. The primary disadvantage of using awards data for application cohorts is 
that events that occur between the time an application is filed and the time of the 
final decision cannot be modeled with aggregate data because the length of this 
period varies greatly across individuals in each application cohort.
5. For initial determinations, the definition of concurrent is based on the status of 
claims at the time the determination is made.
6. This variable is not included in the initial determination regressions reported in 
the appendix to this chapter because we did not have data for the full 1980-1993 
period. It was, however, included in models estimated using the subperiod for 
which it is available. See Lewin-VHI (1995c).
7. We are grateful to Charles Scott of the Office of Supplemental Security Income 
for providing this information.
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8. See U.S. General Accounting Office (1995). A total of 6,500 cases have been 
identified in the states of California and Washington, combined.
9. The decline in initial determinations may have, in part, been a result of improve 
ments in SSA's administrative computer system which were implemented in 
1981. As a result of these improvements, it was frequently unnecessary to process 
a formal application in cases where a person was found to lack insured status. 
While this certainly had a large impact on the formal applications filed, it is 
unclear as to its impact on initial determinations.
10. The /-statistic for the estimate is 7.7. The estimate using the 1980-1987 subpenod 
is 0.73, and the estimate using the 1988-1993 subperiod is 0.84.
11. The /-statistic is 4.3 using the full period. The estimate using the 1980-1987 sub 
penod is 0.8, while that using the 1988-1993 subperiod is 0.3.
12. See the National Academy of Social Insurance (1994) for a detailed description.
13. Note that this upper bound refers to net effects of unmeasured factors. It is 
entirely conceivable that even if the net residual is small, there is room for poten 
tially larger effects that work in opposite directions.
14. The report was mandated by Congress under Section 709 of the Social Security 
Act. Its full title is The Social Security Disability Insurance Program: An Analy-
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Appendix to Chapter 2
As discussed in the text, we estimated a series of pooled cross-section time- 
series models of applications and awards for the 1988-1992 period and of ini 
tial determinations and initial allowance rates for the 1980-1993 period, using 
annual data for states. In the first section of this appendix we provide a techni 
cal description of the methodology. Selected regression results appear in the 
next section, followed by results of simulations using the 1988-1992 estimates.
SPECIFICATION OF POOLED CROSS-SECTION TIME-SERIES 
MODELS
For the 1988-1992 analysis, state application data were disaggregated and 
analyzed by program, sex, age, and impairment: three program groups (DI- 
only, Dl-concurrent, and total SSI), the usual two sex categories, five age 
groups (under 30; 30 to 39; 40 to 49; 50 to 59; and 60 to 64), and four impair 
ment categories (mental illness and mental retardation; musculoskeletal; infec 
tious diseases, including AIDS/HIV, and impairments not otherwise 
classified; 1 and internal organ disorders—including cardiovascular, neo 
plasms, and other internal disorders, as well as impairments caused by acci 
dents. Thus, we estimated a total of 120 (3x2x5x4) application equations; each 
equation refers to applications in a specific program/sex/age/impairment 
group.
The 1988-1992 award analysis was performed at a higher level of aggrega 
tion—by program and sex only (six equations). While we initially obtained 
award data at the more disaggregated level, the 1992 award data were very in 
complete because many decisions were still pending. We subsequently ob 
tained updated data, but only at the higher level of aggregation.
The 1980-1993 initial determination and initial allowance rate analysis was 
performed at a still higher level of aggregation—by program only (Dl-only, 
concurrent, and SSI-only).
The models used in all of the analysis have the same structure. In each case 
the dependent variable is the (natural) logarithm of one of the following: an ap 
plication rate (applications per thousand population); an incidence rate (awards 
per thousand population); an initial determination rate (initial determinations 
per thousand population); or an initial allowance rate (initial allowances per 
initial determination). In the application analysis the population in the denom 
inator is for the relevant age/sex group; in the award analysis it is for those age 
18 to 64 of the relevant sex; and in the initial determination analysis it is for all 
those age 18 to 64.
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The dependent variable in each application equation is the logarithm of an 
application rate. For the higher level of aggregation, the rate is male or female 
applications for the program per one thousand adult males or females, respec 
tively. For the lower level of aggregation, it is an impairment-specific "appli 
cation rate" for the age/gender group — the number of applications in the 
relevant program category per thousand persons from the age/gender group in 
one of the four impairment categories. The dependent variable in the corre 
sponding award equation is the corresponding impairment-specific "incidence 
rate" — the number of awards in the impairment category per thousand persons 
in the age/gender group.
Each equation estimated had the following general form:
]n(Aa ) = p, + p ,*,„ + p^ + . . . + PA, + a, VI, + ... aTVT, + Est
where
Ast is an application, incidence, initial determination, or initial 
allowance rate, as specified above, in state s and year t.
p\5 is the intercept for state s (i.e., the equation intercept varies 
across states). The intercepts are sometimes referred to as fixed 
"state effects" because they capture the effects of all factors that 
vary across states but not over time.
X\sti ^2sf' • • •' Xkst are me explanatory variables. For the 1980- 
1993 analysis these include both current and prior year values of 
selected variables.
P! ... P^ are the coefficients of the X variables, to be estimated.
VI, ... VTt are dummy variables for each year of data except the 
first (base) year. VI equals 0 for the first year and 1 for all subse 
quent years, V2 equals 0 for the first and second year and 1 for all 
subsequent years, etc. VT equals 1 in the last year (T) only.
(Xgg . . . 092 are the coefficients of the year dummies. These are 
sometimes called "year" or "time" effects because each coefficient 
captures the effects of changes in all national factors in the corre 
sponding year that have the same impact on the dependent vari 
able in all states.
Est is the error term for state s and year t
As described in the text, the analysis relates within-state changes in the de 
pendent variable to changes in the explanatory variables. This is not immedi 
ately evident in the above specification, but is in fact correct because of the
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presence of a different intercept for each state. Since these control for all cross- 
state differences that are fixed over time, they in effect control for all of the 
base-year values of the explanatory variables as well as the base-year value of 
the dependent variable. Hence, the coefficients of the explanatory variables are 
determined by how the dependent variables change over time in relationship to 
how the explanatory variables change over time.
The models were estimated by weighted least squares, with weights equal 
to the size of the state's population in the relevant age/gender category. This 
method yields efficient estimates if the variances of the regression disturbances 
are inversely proportional to the size of the group population in the state and 
the disturbances are independent across states and over time. Weighted esti 
mates also provide better predictions of the national level of applications and 
awards relative to unweighted estimates. The reason for this is that they im 
prove the fit for large states relative to small states, and growth in large states 
determines a large share of national growth.2
We also looked for evidence of serial correlation in the disturbances. In the 
1988-92 analysis we assessed the importance of serial and correlation and oth 
er dynamic specification issues by comparing the results obtained from weight 
ed least squares using the full five years of data to results obtained using just 
the first (1988) and last (1992) year of data alone. The main findings were very 
robust in this comparison. The individual state intercepts wash out any autocor 
relation in the "two-year" estimates, which are the basis of the findings report 
ed here. In the 1980-93 analysis it was essential to use all years' observations 
in order to examine dynamic aspects of initial determinations and allowance 
rates. Hence, we specified a first-order autoregressive model for each state's 
weighted disturbance, with a common autocorrelation coefficient for all states. 
The estimated coefficient was always between zero and one and usually was 
significant. We also found some evidence of spatial correlation in pairs of ad 
jacent states, but the evidence was erratic and did not warrant the substantial 
effort required to correct for it. Ignoring spatial correlation does not bias pa 
rameter estimates but can result in estimated standard errors that are biased to 
ward zero. The models were estimated using the Statistical Analysis System 
(SAS); the REG procedure was used for the 1988-92 analysis and the MODEL 
procedure was used for the 1980-93 analysis. Standard errors for the 1980-93 
models were corrected for any cross-state heteroskedasticity in the weighted 
disturbances, but this was not done for the 1988-92 analysis.
REGRESSION RESULTS
Selected application and award regression results for the 1988-1992 period 
are reported in Exhibit 2A.1. These results were estimated using application
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and award data disaggregated by program and sex only; the voluminous appli 
cation results by program, sex, age, and impairment are reported in the appen 
dix to Lewin-VHI (1995b). Selected results from the 1980-1993 analysis of 
initial determinations and allowance rates appear in Exhibits 2A.2 and 2A.3.
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR 1988-1992
We report simulation results based on the 1988-1992 application and award 
models in Exhibit 2A.4. These show the percentage points of average annual 
growth in applications or awards during the period that are accounted for by 
each variable included in the final regression models, by program and sex. The 
application results were obtained by aggregating results simulated by program, 
sex, age, and impairment to the level of program and sex. Note that they do not 
correspond to the aggregate regression results reported in Exhibit 2A.I, but 
those regressions yield results that are very similar. Application simulations by 
age and by impairment are reported in the appendix to Lewin-VHI (1995b). 
The award simulations are based on the award regressions reported in Exhibit 
2 A.I.
Appendix Notes
1. AIDS/HIV cases first were included in the "other" impairment category before 
being recategorized in the infectious disease category.
2. To test for heteroscedasticity, we estimated White standard errors and found that 
they were not significantly different from the standard errors estimated by 
weighted least squares.
Exhibit 2A.1 Selected Regression Estimates for Application and Award Regressions, 1988-1992
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NOTE - Coefficients of variables specified in logarithms are elasticities by definition Except for the time effect, all other coefficients have been converted 
to elasticities "at the mean" by multiplying the coefficient itself by the mean of the variable. Elasticities in bold type have the expected sign and an abso 
lute ^-statistic of at least 2.0 Elasticities in normal type have absolute r-statistics of less than 2.0 Italicized elasticities have the sign opposite that expected 
and absolute f-statistics of at least 2 0. A separate intercept for each state was also included in each model (not reported) 
'The variable used is the log of the state's unemployment rate.
The GA variable is zero for every state in 1988; in 1992 it is the number of cuts in GA beneficiaries per capita between 1991 and 1992 in seven states and 
the District of Columbia and zero in all other states. 
3The AIDS/HIV variable is the logarithm of the incidence rate 
4The IRCA legalizations variable is zero in 1988 and is the number of legalizations per capita in 1992.
The percentage of children in single parent families is in logarithms.
This coefficient is an estimate of the percentage increase in the dependent variable from 1988 to 1992 that is not accounted for by the explanatory vari 
ables.
Exhibit 2A.2 Regression Estimates for Initial Determination Models, 1980-1993

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE Lewm-VHI analysis of SSA data on initial disability determinations, using data for all 50 states and the Distnct of Columbia. SSI-only esti 
mates include children. 
aVanable is in logarithms 
bVanable is age-adjusted. 
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
Exhibit 2A.3 Regression Estimates for Allowance Rate Models, 1980-1993

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE Lewm-VHI analysis of SSA data on initial disability determinations, 
mates include children 
aVanable is in logarithms. 
Variable is age-adjusted 
*Sigmficant at the 0.05 level.
using data for all 50 states and the District of Columbia SSI-only esti-
Exhibit 2A.4 Decomposition of the Growth in Applications and Awards, 1988-1992






























































































































































SOURCE Simulations based on regression analysis of state data for 1988 and 1992
Comments on Chapter 2
Edward Yelin 
University of California, San Francisco
The econometric findings reported by Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2) 
demonstrate a strong relationship between state unemployment rates 
and the growth in applications for Social Security Disability Insurance 
(DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. The analysis 
is more sophisticated than previous research demonstrating this rela 
tionship, principally because the researchers were able to incorporate 
effects due to changes in the demographic structure and in how 
national program rules were implemented in different states (Hambor 
1975; Levitan and Taggart 1977; and Lando, Coate, and Kraus 1979).
Given the strength of these findings and the consistency of these 
results with those of other researchers, policy makers concerned with 
DI and SSI would do well to evaluate the forces in the economy that 
give rise to increases in applications during periods of economic uncer 
tainty. In this commentary, I will outline some of the long-term trends 
that may account for the short-term problems in disability compensa 
tion programs. In suggesting a focus on long-term changes, my 
hypothesis is that persons with disabilities, like minorities and others 
facing difficulties in the labor market, have experienced a dispropor 
tionate amount of the shift in the kind and nature of employment. 
Cyclical downturns may exacerbate some of these changes, or they 
may legitimate applications for benefits that would not be approved 
during good times.
Table 1 lists a few of the changes in the labor market that have 
occurred during the last two decades or so. As men, especially older 
men, have exited the labor force, women have entered the labor force 
in record numbers, a trend especially pronounced among younger 
women. These changes are associated with the shift from a manufac 
turing to a service economy, with men disproportionately represented 
in the former and women in the latter (Yelin 1992). At the same time, 
the nature of work has changed. Smaller proportions of the labor force
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Table 1 Long-Cycle Complements to Short-Cycle Phenomena
• Declining employment rates of men, especially older men
• Rising employment rates of women, especially younger women
• Declining employment in manufacturing
• Rising employment in services
• Increase in part-time employment
• Increase in contingent employment, including self-employment 
temporary, leased, and contract workers
• Declining percentage with employer-provided health insurance 
and pensions
are in full-time, full-year jobs. Greater proportions are self-employed. 
In addition, greater proportions are not actually hired by the firms for 
whom they do the work. Instead, they may work on a contract basis or 
may be employed by a temporary firm. Increasing numbers are 
employed permanently by a contractor who then "leases" the workers 
to the firm for whom the work is done (Osterman 1988). Finally, 
smaller proportions of the labor force report receiving health insurance 
or pension coverage from their employer (U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1993; Yelin 1992).
Employment data .do not cover all these phenomena, but the data 
that are available are consistent with the notion that persons with dis 
abilities experience these trends disproportionately. Table 2 compares 
overall rates of labor force participation for 1970-1972 and 1990- 
1992. Among all men, labor force participation rates declined slightly, 
by 2.6 percent. Among all men age 55 to 64, labor force participation 
declined more steeply, by 16.0 percent overall. Among all men with 
disabilities, labor force participation rates declined by more than 15 
percent, almost ten times the decline experienced by men without dis 
abilities. Similarly, among men age 55 to 64 with disabilities, labor 
force participation rates declined by more than twice as much as 
among men these ages without disabilities. In contrast, among women, 
those with disabilities shared in the growth in employment among all 
women. Indeed, young women with disabilities experienced larger rel 
ative growth than those without disabilities.
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Table 2 Change in Rate of Employment of Persons with and without 
Disabilities, 1970-1972 vs. 1990-1992





















SOURCE- Adapted from Yelm and Katz (1994, Table 1)
Aggregating across a small net decrease in labor force participation 
rates among all men and a large net increase among all women, overall 
labor force participation rates increased by 13.7 percent during the 
period covered. However, the net gain among persons with disabilities 
was small, while among those without disabilities, it was ten times as 
large.
Labor force trends among persons with disabilities would appear to 
be tied to the contraction of manufacturing and the expansion of ser 
vices (Table 3). In 1970, persons with disabilities held 9 percent of 
manufacturing jobs. This proportion declined in the ensuing period, so 
that by 1987 their share of manufacturing jobs fell to 8.3 percent. 
Meanwhile, the share of jobs in services held by persons with disabili 
ties increased, albeit not in a linear fashion, from 9.8 percent to 11.6 
percent, almost 20 percent in relative terms.
The foregoing data are broadly consistent with the notion that per 
sons with disabilities are prone to a last-hired, first-fired phenomenon, 
displaced in declining industries and at higher rates than men without 
disabilities, but hired in expanding ones and at similar rates to women 
without disabilities.
In addition, persons with disabilities would appear to experience 
short-term trends in employment disproportionately. Table 4 shows 
labor force participation rates for persons with and without disabilities 
for the period 1981-1983, a recession; 1983-1990, an expansionary 
era; and 1990-1992, the most recent recession. In the two recessions, 
persons with disabilities experienced much larger declines in employ-
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Table 3 Share of Employment among Persons with Disabilities, by Sector 
and Year
197019821987
Manufacturing 9.0 8.9 8.3 
Services__________9.8_________9.1_________11.6
SOURCE. Author's analysis of National Health Interview Survey.
Table 4 Cyclical Trends in Employment of Persons with and without 
Disabilities (%)
_____Years_____ With disabilities ___ Without disabilities
1981-83 ^5-LO 
1983-90 14.0 8.8 
____1990-92__________-4.1____________-0.8______
SOURCE Author's analysis of Annual March Supplement to Current Population Survey
ment than those without disabilities. In contrast, they experienced a 
larger relative increase in employment when overall employment rates 
were growing.
The long-term phenomenon of displacement of persons with dis 
abilities—particularly men—from industries shedding workers and the 
short-term downturns combine to generate a large pool of applicants 
for disability compensation programs. In addition, other changes in the 
nature of work, including the loss of security, the erosion of benefits, 
and stagnant wages exacerbate these pressures, as does the aging of the 
population and the growing prominence of conditions that begin earlier 
in life, including mental impairments and HIV-related illness.
Stapleton and colleagues have improved the confidence with which 
we can state that economic downturns increase the number of appli 
cants. However, the long-term trends in employment play an important 
role in creating the pressure that emerges in recessions. Thus, although 
we confidently can predict that some of the pressure on disability com 
pensation programs will relent with the end of a recession we also can 
predict that until the employment patterns of persons with disabilities 
match those of persons without, the pressure will return with the next 
recession.
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Comments on Chapter 2
Paul R. Cullinan 
Congressional Budget Office
There is an old saying that goes something like the following: "the 
more things change the more they stay the same." Perhaps nowhere is 
this more true in the public policy arena than for income support pro 
grams for the disabled. Despite significant changes in assistive technol 
ogy and in the legal status of persons with disabilities, many of the 
issues raised in Chapter 2 were addressed in a various forums during 
the 1970s. How do economic factors influence the demand and supply 
of income support for the disabled? How can enhanced work incen 
tives in disability benefit programs be implemented without making the 
programs more attractive to the millions of nonrecipients with signifi 
cant health problems? Can rehabilitation services be effective in 
enabling disabled persons to participate more fully in the workplace? 
How consistent is the administration of the programs across different 
levels of adjudication, among states, and across different types of med 
ical impairments?
My comments refer to the analysis of initial determinations and 
allowance rates for the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs over the 1976-1993 
period. Unlike most studies, this chapter analyses state-level data over 
the period rather than national data or microdata. The authors argue 
that this allows them to isolate state-specific effects from the impact of 
national trends or changes in law. Moreover, the authors analyze the 
effects for several subperiods in order to examine the stability of their 
estimates. As they had hypothesized, initial determinations and allow 
ances for disability benefits are strongly correlated with changes in the 
unemployment rate—i.e., higher unemployment rates lead to increased 
applications and to more allowances. These findings are similar to 
those of studies conducted in the 1970s.
NOTE: These comments represent the views of the author and do not reflect any offi 
cial position of the Congressional Budget Office.
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My comments focus on the adequacy of the economic modeling and 
on some programmatic factors that I think are critical which the 
authors have either ignored or have treated inadequately. While the 
authors have done a commendable job in employing state-level data in 
their modeling, I think they have relied too heavily on their state and 
time variables to capture the effects of changing program parameters.
The authors address the issues of applying for disability benefits 
from an economic perspective that individuals with severe health 
impairments will choose to apply for benefits when the expected 
returns are high compared with the rewards of market employment. 
Because this is most relevant for persons applying for DI, my com 
ments will focus on this group of applicants. In their analysis, returns 
from work are modeled indirectly through unemployment rates, labor 
force participation rates, and manufacturing's share of total employ 
ment. There are no social security-specific variables because the pro 
gram is not assumed to vary by state. Any differences among states are 
supposed to be captured within the state dummy variables, and any 
social security changes would be controlled for through the time vari 
ables.
The implications of this specification are that higher unemployment 
rates increase job search costs, increase worker uncertainty about job 
stability, and may lead to slower wage growth. Similarly, declining 
manufacturing employment is assumed to be associated with an 
increased scarcity of "good" jobs. Ceteris paribus, a worsening of any 
of these conditions would be expected to tilt the scales toward 
increased applications for DI.
The potential returns from applying for public benefits depend on 
the level of benefits (both cash and in-kind), the rate at which benefits 
will change over time, and the expense of applying for the benefits. But 
an overriding concern is likely to be the probability of actually being 
allowed to receive the benefits and to retain the benefits over the 
remainder of the person's working life. Given the relatively stringent 
eligibility standards for DI, the potential applicant must also weigh the 
loss of earnings capacity that might occur while the applicant is out of 
work waiting for a final disability determination. Only a minority of 
unsuccessful applicants are able to find market employment after they 
have been denied DI benefits.
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The authors use time variables to proxy programmatic changes, but 
interpreting the variables' coefficients is not straight-forward. The vari 
ables may be picking up the impact of macroeconomic or fiscal policy 
effects not captured by the other instruments in the regression equa 
tions. Moreover, even within the arena of social security policy, the 
coefficients may be influenced by a number of changing program 
parameters—sometimes operating in opposing directions. During the 
period, there were significant legislative changes affecting the generos 
ity of benefits and major changes in administrative factors as well. The 
1977 and 1980 social security amendments resulted in reduced benefits 
for a significant portion of the applicant pool, particularly younger 
adults with families. The phasing-out of student benefits in the Omni 
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 also lessened family benefits 
for applicants with older children. In addition, the administrative cli 
mate over the 1977-1982 period was one of much greater scrutiny of 
applications and allowances, with applications declining by more than 
17 percent and initial allowance rates falling from 47 percent in 1977 
to 29 percent by 1982. The fact that applications continued to decline 
amidst the worst recession in the postwar experience is very likely an 
indication that potential applicants recognized that it was much more 
difficult to be found disabled by the Social Security Administration 
than it had been in the previous decade.
As if these programmatic factors weren't enough, several other 
aspects of program administration also played a role. First, an increas 
ing number of denied applicants are appealing their denials to obtain a 
hearing with an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Moreover, the ALJs 
are reversing a larger and larger share of the determinations that they 
review, with the reversal rate climbing from around 60 percent in 1987 
to 75 percent in 1992. The result is that more than one-half of the 
growth in awards from 1986-1992 came from reversals by ALJs. 
Because the authors' analysis for the 1980-1993 period focuses on ini 
tial determinations, this large and critical contributor to program 
growth is ignored.
Although the quality control data of the Social Security Administra 
tion (SSA) have indicated little change in the accuracy of decisions 
made by state Disability Determination Services (DDSs), there are rea 
sons to suspect that the DDSs may not be as thorough as they were in 
the early 1980s, thereby leading to higher reversal rates upon appeal.
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Despite a 60 percent increase in the number of decisions made by 
DDSs over the 1986-1993 period, DOS staffing levels were virtually 
unchanged leading to decisions per staff year rising from 149 in 1986 
to 247 in 1993. Such a large increase in productivity over a relatively 
short period is remarkable, and it would be surprising—at least to cer 
tain observers—if none of this gain was in fact attributable to a less 
comprehensive review of applications by the DDSs.
Another and possibly related pattern is the increasing use of voca 
tional factors in disability determinations. In 1983, only 17.7 percent of 
awards at the initial determination level depended on vocational fac 
tors; the comparable figure for 1991 was 31.7 percent. This trend might 
be expected to increase the frequency with which the determinations 
are questioned, because decisions based on vocational considerations 
rather than solely medical evaluations tend to be more subjective.
Federal court decisions and the SSA's responses to them can also 
change the calculus facing the potential applicant. Since 1986, SSA 
has had a policy of acquiescing to circuit court decisions for all cases 
in that particular circuit. Consequently, instead of having a unified fed 
eral policy concerning disability determinations, the standards vary 
from state to state and from one judicial circuit to another. This raises 
questions about the interpretation of the coefficients of the state 
dummy variables as indicators of state-specific effects rather than of 
programmatic differences.
Despite these limitations, the authors' analysis is encouraging to 
researchers in the area. Given the aging of the baby-boom population 
into the stages of life with higher disability rates, it is important to 
understand better the factors that influence growth in public disability 
programs. This study and many others like it are necessary if we are to 
have enough information to adapt our nation's support system for the 
disabled in an ever-changing society.
Comments on Chapter 2
Richard G. Frank 
Harvard Medical School
The point of departure for the analysis reported in Chapter 2 is that 
there has been substantial growth in applications and awards under 
both the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Dis 
ability Insurance (DI) disability programs over the period 1988-1992. 
The chapter represents an effort to look behind the overall trends in 
program growth and to identify some basic forces that might be con 
tributing to the impressive rates of growth in awards. The authors pro 
ceed by gathering evidence from a variety of sources. They make use 
of econometric analysis, interviews with experts, and documentary 
materials on program changes. This is a very appealing approach to 
developing a complete view of the evolution of two complex programs.
In the comments below, I will attempt to accomplish three things. 
First, I will highlight several key observations made by the authors 
about the nature of growth during the period. Second, I will review 
their list of key forces that may be most important for understanding 
the exceptionally high growth in SSI and DI awards in the mental ill 
ness category. Finally, I will comment in some detail on three forces 
that may offer the most promising explanations and discuss what I 
found to be most persuasive in the authors' work and where more anal 
ysis may be needed.
BASICS
In assessing the growth in disability awards under SSI and SSDI, the 
authors decompose growth by two variables: 1) program status—DI- 
only, SSI-only, and DI/SSI concurrently; and 2) impairment class— 
i.e., disease class. When the data are stratified by these two factors, a 
number of important observations immediately emerge that serve to
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focus the rest of their work. The first observation is that even though 
changes in both application and allowance rates occurred during the 
1988 to 1992 period, it was the rise in application rates that made the 
largest contribution to the growth in awards for all three program 
classes (83 percent for Dl-only, 91.8 percent for DI/SSI, and 91.2 per 
cent for SSI-only). The second observation is that the growth in both 
applications and allowance rates for the mental illness class were well 
above the overall rates of growth for all impairments. For example, for 
the SSI-only program class, the growth in applications was 86 percent 
for mental illness, compared to 66.9 percent for all conditions. The 
third observation is that the growth in the application rate for the men 
tal illness class was above that for all other conditions, thereby driving 
up the growth in awards for this impairment group above that for all 
impairments.
EXPLANATIONS
Five basic explanations are offered in Chapter 2. Table 1 associates 
each type of explanation according to which component of the award 
rate it is most likely to affect. The likely impact of changes in the 
Social Security Administration criteria are clear and were relevant pri 
marily to mental illness, so I will not address that factor in any detail 
here. State outreach activities have also been well documented and dis 
cussed by the authors, so that I will not deal with that policy change.
Cost Shifting
This factor involves economic choices that differ from those typi 
cally discussed in the context of disability policy. The choices made in 
cost shifting behavior are generally not initially made by program ben 
eficiaries or potential beneficiaries. Issues related to cost shifting are 
among the most important discussed by the authors. They present some 
very suggestive econometric evidence showing that decisions about the 
structure of state income support programs made by state governments 
may have large impacts on federal disability programs and the federal 
budget. The primary policy analyzed by the authors is the impact of
Growth in Disability Benefits 105 












cuts in state General Assistance (GA) programs. They show that the 
impact on growth in awards for the mental illness category is espe 
cially large and significant.
It is important to note that there is more to the cost shifting story 
than GA cuts. A question implied by the line of research pursued by 
the authors is: What has changed for states to make cost shifting more 
attractive in the late 1980s and early 1990s? Part of the explanation 
offered by the authors relates to fiscal pressure on state budgets due to 
1) the economic slowdown of the early 1990s, and 2) limits placed on 
growth and taxation at the state level. Also growth in nonhealth and 
human service segments of state budgets, such as prisons, may have 
caused states to more aggressively pursue other ways to pay for income 
support and medical assistance for indigent people.
A second explanation is important in explaining the growth of 
awards for mental disability. During the late 1980s a number of states 
were decentralizing their public mental health systems. Decentraliza 
tion was usually accompanied by altered financial incentives for local 
government. Among the most important changes was abandoning defi 
cit funding of local mental health programs. The result is strong incen 
tives to enroll people in programs where federal dollars can be 
captured, since localities can keep the state dollars offset by the federal 
monies. This is an area where more probing would undoubtedly be 
valuable.
Recession
The authors advance two explanations about how the recession gen 
erates the observed pattern of awards by impairment class. The first
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argues that the recession hits "marginal" workers hardest. The second 
posits that the recession causes mental illness. The evidence on the first 
is reasonably strong. There is also other evidence suggesting that the 
marginal worker effect is not a transitory phenomenon. Recent papers 
by Cutler and Katz (1991) and Levy and Murname (1992) show that 
throughout the 1980s demand for labor shifted away from low-skill, 
low-education workers. The severely mentally ill disproportionately 
fall into this group.
The second explanation offered, that recessions cause mental ill 
ness, is not very persuasive. If one examines rates of major mental dis 
orders in the 1980-1983 and the 1990-1991 periods, one is struck by 
the stability in prevalence rates. Moreover, if one examines the 
research on mental health and work where there exists some opportu 
nity to sequence events, the impact of mental health on work is far 
stronger than the effect of work on mental illness.
The last point builds on the impact of mental illness on social out 
comes such as work. Virtually all the research in this area suggests that 
mental disorders lead to elevated rates of divorce, early marriage and 
child-bearing in women, and lower levels of household income. This 
accords well with the observations that 1) SSI mental illness awardees 
are more female than the overall SSI population; and 2) females in the 
mental illness impairment group tend to be older than other SSI 
females.
CONCLUSIONS
The authors have carefully examined available evidence and used 
good sense and solid statistical analysis to study SSI award growth by 
impairment class. They have offered some important empirical clues 
about what matters most. A particularly unsettling finding relates to 
cost shifting behavior. The result suggests that state welfare reforms 
may lead to shifting of responsibility to federal programs and new 
pressures on the federal budget. I believe they are pointing to key fac 
tors that need immediate analysis in order to understand the conse 
quences of our newest political currents as they become policy.
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